Corporation Law by Wright, Floyd A.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation




The number of Florida decisions relating to corporation law has been
quite limited during the last two years. On the other hand, the legislature
in its 1953 session enacted an unprecedented mass of statutes in that field
of the law. Therefore, our primary concern will be centered on an
examination of the legislative efforts in this regard.
Back through the annals of legislative history, it is doubtful if any
general assembly ever ground out a grist of legislation on corporation law
as varied and illogical as that of the 34th Florida Legislature. After enacting
a series of separate acts, amending and repealing numerous sections of
the then existing corporation statutes, the legislature finally attempted to
effect a general revision of the corporation laws. But that final attempt,
when compared with the results achieved heretofore by the legislatures
of a third of the states in adopting modern business corporation acts, resulted
in a fiasco.
Although the final purported general revision' effected a few desirable
changes in the former hodgepodge of antiquated corporation statutes of
the state, the new confusion and uncertainty thereby injected into the law
will more than offset any benefits that may accrue from these bizarre,
misguided legislative endeavors.
Four objectives will be pursued in this article. First, the few
improvements in the Florida corporation statutes accomplished by the
numerous special enactments and the ultimately attempted general revision
will be examined; second, the mischievous features resulting from the new
legislation will be scrutinized; third, the salient deficiencies in the statutory
corporation law of Florida left uncorrected by the legislature in its abortive
undertaking will be reviewed; and, fourth, the development in Florida
corporation law through court decisions will be analyzed. Owing to the
fact that a drastic need for a thorough, modern revision of our corporation
statutes has been fully treated elsewhere by this author,' that element will
not be elaborated upon to any great extent.
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Chairman and Draftsman of
the Florida Corporation Code Drafting Committee. Member of the Kansas, Oklahoma,
and Federal Bars.
1. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28170, FLA. STAT. c. 608 (1953).
2. Oklahoma Corporation Law-Does it Need Revision? 7 OKrA. ST. B.J.
224 (1937); Past and Present Trends in Corporation Law: Is Florida in Step?
2 MiAMI L.Q. 69 (1947): Protection of Creditors Under the Proposed Florida
Business Corporation Act, 6 NIIAi L.Q. 192 (1952); Need for a Drastic Revision
of the Florida Corporation Laws, 26 FLA. L.J. 84 (1952); The Proposed Florida
Business Corporation Act-The Modus Operandi Eniloyed in Preparing It and Other
Similar Codes, 26 FLA. L. J. 259 (1952); Current Developments in Statutory Corporation
Law, 7 MIAMx L.Q. 1 (1952).
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I. IMPROVEMENTS EFFECTED BY THE 1953 LEGISLATURE
The most noteworthy accomplishment resulted from the repealing of
numerous undesirable provisions found in the former statutes. All of
Chapter 611 and a major portion of Chapters 610 and 6123 were repealed,
and several of the baneful provisions and procedures provided for therein
were not carried over into the new enactments. Hereafter it will not be
necessary to follow a separate, outmoded procedure when organizing types
of corporations listed in former Section 611.01. The antiquated letters
patent as a device for organizing corporations, as provided in Chapter 611,
were abrogated. All strictly private corporations from now on will be
organized under the new Chapter 608, 4 and the general regulations and
procedures (with a few exceptions') will apply equally to all corporations.
Special mention should be made of the elimination of the vicious potential
liability under Section 611.05.0 Many other obsolete, ambiguous, conflicting,
duplicitious provisions scattered throughout Chapters 610, 611, and 612
were in the repealed sections. In many, many instances it formerly was
difficult to ascertain if the provisions in one of the chapters would apply
to corporations organized under another chapter.
Many of the provisions in Chapters 610 and 611 were carried down
from Florida's first general corporation statutes, adopted in 1868. These
ancient concepts tad been amended and added to from time to time during
the span of 85 years until both chapters had become an uncorrelatel
hodgepodge. In 1825, Chapter 612 was added. This served to
modernize procedures somewhat. On the other hand, much of the content
of that chapter dealt with the same subject matter as did Chapters 610
and 611, thereby creating further duplicities, conflicts, and ambiguities. It
would have been better if the legislature had waited three years and
adopted the Uniform Business Corporation Act when it was released in
1928, repealing all of the existing general corporations statutes, as
Louisiana did.
Another improvement resulted from the provisions (although they fall
woefully short of much more comprehensive provisions found in the statutes
3. Fi. STAT. (1951).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. See FL. STAT. §§ 608.01. 608.03(1)(b), 608.03(3), 608.13(12), and 608.60(1953). Some confusion may result from the fact that § 608.05(2) refers to banks
being organized under c. 608, while Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28016, sets up a new banking
code, providing exclusive procedures for organizing banks.
6. There was much confusion as to whether corporations organized under
c. 612 must do the filing required under § 611.05 to escape the possible liability
provided otherwise therein. The provisions in the section set out that they applied
to "every corporation." Apparently, the legislature, in adopting c. 612, assumed
that the requirements were all-inclusive, as they excepted, in the original 1925 act,
corporations organized under c. 612 from the requirements in § 611.05. Later tile
provision so excepting corporations from the requirements was repealed. That would
seem to mean that all corporations thereafter organized under e. 612 would be subject
to the requirements in § 611.05.
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of many other states) 7 allowing minority groups of shareholders to vote
as a class in authorizing a charter amendment when the rights of such
groups are affected adversely.8  Also, some betterment was attained by
setting forth more fully the procedure to be followed in affecting a
merger or consolidation,9 including the steps to be taken by dissenting
shareholders and the procedure to be followed in fixing the value of their
shares.10
These enumerations just about exhaust all the revisionary features of
the new legislation which could possibly be placed on the credit side
of the ledger. Any other advancements are too meager and doubtful to
justify a favorable listing. Moreover, a large portion of the aforementioned
benefits were negatived, as hereinafter discussed, by reenacting similar, or
even more pernicious, provisions in the new acts adopted.
II. MISCHTEVOUS FEATURES OF NEW AcTs
It seems well to repeat that the legislature during its last session
adopted a fanciful series of bills; repealing, amending, and reenacting
(restated and often expanded) portions of the former statutes which it had
repealed. The whole gamut evidences no logical method, plan, or system.
NVithout rhyme or reason a number of piecemeal, isolated bills were enacted,
one after another, repealing and amending various unrelated sections of the
former statutes. The procedure employed, until late in its course, seemed
to be void of any general objective. Finally, a substantial revision of the
statutes relating to corporations was effected, but the ultimate bill was so
poorly planned and so slovenly drafted that the present statutory corporation
laws of Florida are left in a chaotic state. As antiquated as our corporation
laws were and as urgently as the need for a modern Florida business
corporation code was, the present laws will serve only to further retard
corporate development in the state. Only time will tell the extent of the
resulting injury to the economy of Florida.
During the last three weeks of the session," the legislative cleaver was
busily employed in chopping away at the corporation statutory structure
of the state. No less than fifteen different bills, changing our corporation
7. Modem business corporation acts have been adopted as follows: Ohio (1927),
La. (1928), Idaho (1929), Cal. (1931), Ill., Minn., and Pa. (1933), Wash. (1934),
Neb. (1941), Mo. (1943), Ky. (1946), Okla. (1947), and Md. and Wis. (1951).
Many of these acts have been revised from time to time since their original adoptions.
Moreover, several other jurisdictions, such as Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and the District of Columbia, have adopted corporation codes which are
semrii-modern in content. The latest to take this step was the District of Columbia
in 1953. It also should be mentioned that Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and
several other states have kept their corporation statutes quite well up to date by repeated
piecemeal amendments, while not effecting any single drastic, wholesale revision. See
articles published by this author, listed in note 2 supra.
8. FLA. STAT. § 608.181) (1953).
9. FLA. STAT. § 608.12-08.23 (1953).
10. FLA. STAT. § 608.23 (1953).
11. The session was adjourned May 6, 1953.
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laws, were enacted. These new acts became effective at various intervals
from May 19th to October Ist. Thus, for a period of over four months our
corporation statutes shifted like the sands of the Sahara.
These series of enactments became law, as follows: May 19-H.B. 24,12
lowering the minimum par of shares, and H.B. 4312 providing for organization
of savings banks; May 27-S.B. 158," relating to share certificates, S.B. 159,",
concerning amendments of certificates of incorporation, and S.B. 160,16
regarding power of corporations to issue shares; June 2-H.B. 21,'I pertaining
to corporate gross receipt taxes, H.B. 88,18 respecting proof of incorporation,
H.B. 366,19 validating instruments executed by directors or trustees of
dissolved foreign corporations, and H.B. 513,20 relating to corporate power
to change number of directors; June 15-S.B. 306,21 concerning capital
stock tax; August 5-H.B. 45,22 extending, etc., eminent domain to certain
classes of corporations, H.B. 46, S.B. 34,23 adopting a new banking code,
Sections 660.09 and 660.10 of which contain provisions relating to other
types of corporations, and H.B. 809,24 giving the secretary of state supervisory
and administrative powers over the corporation laws; October 1-H.B. 1125,25
purporting to effect a general revision of matters relating to domestic
corporations for profit, and S.B. 1090,28 pertaining to taxes and fees on
foreign corporations. This period of rapid and unpredictable changes in
the Florida corporation statutes naturally resulted in extreme confusion
among corporate attorneys and business management.
It would be confusing indeed for a football team if rules were to be
changed a dozen or fifteen times during a game, or even during the playing
season. Definite rules are as essential to the captains of commerce and
industry as to football captains. This author has been unable to find one
instance in legislative history where a legislative body has engaged in an
onslaught on any branch of the law comparable with this.
One hundred and thirty-one of the 143 sections contained in Chapters
610, 611, and 612 were repealed. Two sections were twice repealed,27 five
12. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28010, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 625.02 and 611.06 (1951).
13. Fa. Laws 1953, c. 28012, adding FLA. STATr. § 654.01 (1953).
14. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28051, amending FLA. S'rAT-. § 612.17 (1951).
15. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28049, amending FLA. STAT. § 612.05 (1951).
16. Fia. Laws 1953, c. 28050, amending FLA. STAT. § 612.09 (1951).
17. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28091, adding FLA. STAT. § 203.01 (1953).
18. Via. Laws 1953, c. 28077, amending FIA. STAT. § 612.23 (1951).
19. Via. Laws 1953, c. 28078 (new provision).
20. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28089, amending FL. STAT. § 610.03 (1951).
21. Fla. Laws 1953, e. 28248, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 610.07, 610.08, 610.10 and
610.15, and repealing §§ 610.13 and 610.14 (1951).
22. Fia. Laws 1953, c. 28007, adding new FLA. STAT. §§ 74.141, 74.142 (1951).
23. Via. Laws 1953, c. 28016, adding four new chapters, viz., FLA. STAT. c. 658, 659,
660 and 661 (1953).
24. Ma. Laws 1953, c. 28086. adding FLA. S'rAT. § 15.13 (1951).
25. VMa. Laws 1953, e. 28170, repealing major portions of FLA. STAT. §§ 610, 611
and 612, (1951), and revising and consolidateing greater portions of sections repealed, thus
creating new FiA. STAT. c. 608 (1953).
26. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28285, amending FiA. STAT. c. 613.03 (1951).
27. FLA. STAT. §§ 610.13 and 610.14 (1951), repealed by Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28248
and again c. 28170.
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were amended and later repealed,2s five were amended but not repealed, 9,
and seven were retained without change.30
The new legislation leaves the arrangement and content of our
corporation statutes in as bad a mess as existed under the former statutes.
House Bill 1125 created a new Chapter, 608. Eight sections of Chapter
610 have been left,3 1 all of Chapter 611 has been repealed, and four sections- 2
of Chapter 612 have been amended and retained. Previously, we had
Chapters 610, 611, and 612. Now we have Chapter 608, followed by Chapter
609, which deals with business trusts, and then comes Chapter 610 and 612,
further dealing with corporations for profit. There is no justification for
not repealing the remaining eight sections of Chapter 610 and the remaining
four of Chapter 612. If any of the provisions contained therein were to be
retained they should have been reincorporated into the newly-created
Chapter 608. '[lien it would have been better to have numbered the new
chapter as Chapter 610, or 612, thus keeping the corporation statutes grouped
together.
Moreover, most of these sections retained in Chapters 610 and 612,
should, for other reasons, have been repealed. Section 608.13 covers the
same subject matter as Section 610.03. It is silly to have two sections on
corporate powers, each worded differently and varying in content, while
covering the same matter-and especially so when much of the new
section (608.13) was copied verbatim from the prior unrepealed section
(610.03).
The retained Section 610.29 relates to the protection of the names
of veterans' associations and has little relation to corporation law in
general. This section should have been repealed or transferred to the
chapter on eleemosynary corporations, or possibly assigned to the part of
the statutes relating to the protection of names against unfair trade
practices. There is really no need for such provisions in state legislation
as the matter is more fully regulated by federal statutes.
Sections 610.31 to 610.36, inclusive, should have been repealed. This
author has found no such provisions dealing with the regulation of clubs
in the corporation statutes of other jurisdictions. The value of such
provisions is nil. If a "club" is organized as a corporation for profit, it
would come under the general provisions the same as other corporations.
If it is not run for profit, any regulations relating thereto belong in the
chapter on eleemosynary corporations. On the alternative, since these
28. FIA. STAT. §§ 610.07, 610.08, 610.10 and 610.15 (1951), amended by Fla. Laws
1953, c. 28248; FLA. S-rTAr. § 611.06 (1951), amended Ha. Laws 1953, c. 28010, and
all later repealed by Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28170.
29. FIA. STAT. 610.03 (1951), amended Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28089: FLA. STAT.
§ 612.05 (1951), amended Fla, Laws 1953, c. 28049; FLA. STAT. § 612.09 (1951),
amended Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28050; FLA. STAT. § 612.17 (1951), amended Fla. Laws
1953, c. 28051; FLA. STAT. § 612.63 (1951), amended Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28077.
30. FLA. STAT. §§ 610.29, 610.31-610.36 (1951).
31. § 610.03 (amended), and the sections listed in note 30 supra.
32. §§ 612.05, 612.09, 612.17, and 612.63 (all amended).
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six sections are penal in nature, they could well be grouped in the chapter
on crimes and punishment, or possibly be placed with other provisions
relating to unfair trade practices and protection of other trade names. It
is extremely illogical to have these few sections retained, making up the
sole content of Chapter 610, entitled "Corporations, General Provisions,"
sticking out like a sore thumb. Therefore, it is conclusive that all of
the retained sections of Chapter 610 should have been repealed.
Section 612.05 (amended and retained) relates to the same subject
matter as, and conflicts with the content of, new Section 608.18. The
same is true as to Sections 612.09 (amended and retained) and 608.14
(new), 612.17 (amended and retained) and 608.41 (new), and 612.63
(amended and retained) and 608.06 (new). Section 612.63, as amended
in H.B. 88, C. 28077, and left unrepealed, refers back to and is dependent
upon the procedures set out in eight sections in Chapter 612 (612.03,
612.06, 612.22, 612.36, 612.37, 612.38, 612.46, and 612.64), which sections
were repealed by H.B. 1125, C. 28170. Sections 612.05, as amended in
S.B. 159, C. 28049, and 612.09, as amended in S.B. 160, C. 28050, were not
repealed. Section 612.63, as amended, also refers back to the procedures
in those two sections. Such grotesque folderol cannot be justified under
any circumstances, and especially not, when the Attorney General's
Office and the two Houses of the Legislature had before them a draft
of a comprehensive modem business corporation code which for unfounded
reasons they brushed aside without giving it due consideration.
At this point the general contents of the revisionary act, H.B. 1125,
Fla. Laws 1953, C. 28170, which makes up Chapter 608 of the 1953 Florida
Statutes, will be examined and evaluated. This is the general corporation
act which became effective October 1, 1953. It was passed, and filed in
the office of the secretary of state on June 15, 1953, after the legislature
had .adopted, as mentioned above, a series of special acts, amending and
repealing scattered sections of the former Chapters 610, 611, and 612.
Section 608.01 is more or less a restatement of former Section 610.01, with
the addition of redundant verbiage. It provides that Chapter 608 shall
apply to all corporations, except in instances where special acts relating
to special types of corporations contain provisions which conflict with its
provisions, whereupon the provisions in the special acts shall govern. It
further provides that the chapter will not invalidate or affect existing
corporations or acts thereof. The content and substance of the section
is not seriously objectionable although it is poorly worded.
Section 608.02 is new. It makes up a "definitions" section,3 3 defining
"articles of incorporation" and "certificate of incorporation." Both of these
33. All modem business corporation acts contain a definition section, defining a
long array of terms which are repeated several times in the bodies of the acts. See the
elaborate Draftsman's Note in the annotations under Oklahoma Business Corporation
Act. IS OULA. STAT. A N. tit. 2, § 1.2. This author was the draftsman of both the
Oklahoma Act and the annotations therein.
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terms are defined as one and the same thing. In both instances the
instrument defined makes up the charter. Prior to the time that corporate
existence begins, 4 it is defined as "articles of incorporation," but thereafter
it is known as a "certificate of incorporation." In other words, the certificate
of incorporation is the articles of incorporation with the approval of the
secretary of state stamped thereon. This will cause much confusion. How
will the incorporators know what heading to use on the document? Should
they label it "Articles of Incorporation," or "Certificate of Incorporation"?
It could be argued that the former title should be used, as Section 608.03
states that the incorporators shall file the articles in the office of the
secretary of state for approval. It further sets out how the instrument is
to be executed and what it is to contain; and refers to it as the articles
of incorporation. But such a title would be a misnomer after the
instrument had shifted to the category of a certificate of incorporation.
Possibly the secretary of state could scratch out the word "Articles" and
write in the word "Certificate." That would not quite solve the problem,
as Section 608.04 states that the original copy of the articles is to be
filed in the records of the office of the secretary of state. Nowhere in
the act is the instrument referred to as "Articles of Incorporation" after
such filing.
At this point the words, "file" and "filing" inject ambiguity and
confusion into the matter. As a general rule, when filing the articles is
referred to in statutes, it means the placing of the articles in the official
file (usually by the secretary of state) where they are to be kept as public
records. However, in Chapter 608 the word "file" or "filing" seems to take
on three different connotations in relation to the articles (or certificate
of incorporation). Certainly the certificate of incorporation would be filed
of record. Then, as before mentioned, the original articles are filed of
record, while Section 608.03 (1) refers to a filing of the articles in the
office of the secretary of state by the incorporators. This filing by the
incorporators seems to come prior to the approval by the secretary of
state. If there are to be three filings, would there be three different filing
fees charged? It is believed that this rigmarol about filing could have
been stated in a less ambiguous manner.
Section 612.63 was amended by H.B. 88,35 but was not repealed by
H.B. 1125, C. 28170 (i.e. Chapter 608). The second paragraph of Section
612.63, as amended, reads:
The terms certificate of incorporation as used in this chapter
unless the context shall otherwise require, shall include all
certificates filed pursuant to sections 612.03, 612.05, 612.06, 612.09,
and 612.22, respectively, and any agreement of merger or consolida-
34. Corporate existence begins "when the articles of incorporation have been filed
in the office of the secretary of state and approved by him and all filing fees and taxes
have been paid." FLA. STAT. § 608.04 (1953).
35. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28077.
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tion filed pursuant to sections 612,36, 612.37 or 612.38 and any
certificate of dissolution flIed pursuant to section 612.46 of this
chapter and any certificate of re-incorporation filed pursuant to
section 612.64 of this chapter.
The rule of res ipsa loquitur applies to this. As heretofore mentioned,
all of these sections in Chapter 612 referred to, except Sections 612.05 and
612.09, were repealed. These two sections, and Section 612.63, as amended
by H.B. 88, were retained. The interpretations of this tangle will be left
to the reader-or possibly to the courts.
The provisions in both Sections 608.02 and 608.06(2), and in Section
612.63 (as amended) are too broad in providing that any agreement or
documents permitted to be filed in the office of the secretary of state
become a part of the certificate of incorporation. Especially is that true,
when filed connotes the meaning which it does in Section 608.03(1), namely,
when the instruments are presented to the secretary of state. A corporation
is privileged to file in that sense, any sort of document with the secretary
of state. The only requirement in the act is that it must concern the
corporation. Suppose it is an agreement among the shareholders that
members of the board of directors are to be shot at sunrise. Once it
were filed with the secretary of state, it would become a part of the
certificate of incorporation. Of course, the secretary of state would refuse
to file it of record. But it would be filed with the secretary of state by
the corporate officers presenting it, as the term is used in Section 608.03,
and once thus presented it could not be said that it was not filed.
The articles or certificate of incorporation becomes the charter of a
corporation. The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dartmouth
College Case," held that a corporate charter was a contract between the
state and the corporation. Thus, the charter only includes those provisions
which make up that contract. Section 608.18 sets out definite mandatory
procedures to be followed in amending the charter (certificate of
incorporation) .7 Sections 608.02, 608.14 (3), and 612.63 make it permissive
for the corporation to file all sorts of instruments. And, as above mentioned,
when filed is given the meaning which is conferred upon it in the act, a
corporation could file any document it chose. Then, taking the provisions
as found in Sections 608.02, 608.14(3), and 612.63, we find that the
certificate of incorporation is amended every time any instruments relating
to the corporation are filed with the secretary of state.
It is suggested that in defining terms it would have been well if this
act had defined "filing," and, once the term had been defined, to have
uniformly used it to depict the concept set out in its definition. That
is one of the important skills in efficient drafting of statutes. The draftsman
must first have very definite concepts and then he must manifest an
36. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819).
37. FLA. STAT. § 608.18 (1953).
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ability to employ proper words, phrases, clauses, and sentences which
clearly convey the scope and limitations of such concepts. Tlen, these
well-delimited concepts, by means of appropriate nomenclature and
phraseology, must be uniformly applied throughout the draft. No other
element will more glaringly reveal a touch of amateurishness, or un-
warantably cause more extensive litigation, than the loose, inconsistent
use of words and phrases in drafting legislation.
The multitude of ambiguous, inappropriate, indefinite, vague,
inconsistently-employed verbiage scattered throughout this new corporation
act ([.B. 1125) reveals the puerile accomplishment of unskilled novices.
The defects become glaringly evident when a comparison is made between
such an abortive effort and the contents of the dozen or more modern
business corporation codes of other states. It means the contrasting of
the work of tyros with the product of professional giants. Each of the
respective modern business corporation acts evidence the wisdom, training,
and years of dint and toil employed in formulating it. In each instance,
the master hands and minds of the draftsmen are divulged in their
delectable product-Marshall and Davies in the Ohio Act, Ballantine and
Sterling in the California Act, Millard B. Kennedy in the Illinois Act,
Judge Solether in the Minnesota Act, etc., etc. These men in their
respective committees were phalanxed with the most highly-skilled
technicians available in the field of corporation law.
Attention will now be called to the following words and phrases
in the new act (Chapter 608). "Approval," 3 in the last line of Section
608.02; "purpose,"39 in the second line of Section 608.03(1); "persons,"4 0
in the same sentence; "natural person,"-1 in Section 608.03(2) (a); "kind, ' 42
and "all shares,"4 in Section 608.03(2)(c); "capital,""1 in Section
38. Approval by the incorporators, or by the secretary of state?
39. Does this mean that a corporation can have only one purpose? If so, tile
provision conflicts with other provisions in the Act. \Why was the singular form used?
40. Must such "person" be of any special age, or possess any special competence?
Could such "person" be another corporation?
41. Does this mean a "physical" person? If so, he could be freeman or slave,
adult or infant, a live person or a dead one. Or, does it mean a "psychological" person?
If so, it could be a slave, infant, or even a corporation, excluding the dead person.
Possibly, it means a "legal" or "juristic" person. If so, it could mean any competent
individual person or a corporation. Also, the word comrpetent is a variable when referring
to a person. Competent for what-to inherit property (if so, he may be unborn),
or to become president of the United States (if so, he must have reached the age
of 35)? A corporation is as much a "natural person," in a legal sense, as is an
individual person. A slave is a natural person, but is not a legal person until emancipated.
All legal persons are created by operation of law, and so, whether speaking of an
individual or of a corporation. Such legal personality is as natural when possessed
by a corporation as when the possessor is an emancipated slave. Why didn't the draftsman
say, "an individual person competent to contract"?
42, This new term in stock nomenclature is discussed further on in the body of
this article.
43, Must all the characteristics and attributes of all par shares be listed in the
articles?
44. Does capital here mean capital as defined in § 608.17?
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608.03(2) (d); "principal office," 45 in Section 608.03(2) (f); "subscribers,""6
in Section 608.03(4); "subscriber,"' 47 in Section 608.04; "composite certificate
of incorporation, ' '4 in Section 608.06; "he deems proper," 49 at the end of
Section 608.06; "and the laws of the United States and of this state, 50
at the end of Section 608.07; "full age," 51 in Section 608.09(l); "chosen, ' ' -
near the end of Section 608.12; "guarantee,"53 in Section 608.13 (9); "man, 5 4
in Section 608.13(12); "special stock," 5 in Section 608.14(2); "fully paid
and non-assessable,"56 at the end of Section 608.15; "amount of capital,"57
in Section 608.17; "having capital stock,"58 in the first line of Section 608.18;
45. Does that mean the registered office?
46. Does that mean subscribers to shares or subscribers of the articles? If the latter,
why not use "incorporators"? That term is employed in line 1, § 608.03(2) (i).
47. What does this word, singular in form, mean? Such "subscriber thereof, their
successors and assigns shall constitute a corporation." The statement, taken as a whole,
is nonsense. A person, or persons, don't become the corporation. In a legal sense,
the corporation is a separate entity.
48. What is a composite certificate of incorporation? Elsewhere, throughout the act,
the phrase, certificate of incorporation, is used by itself.
49. There should be a statutory schedule of charges. Such fees should not be
left to the whims and caprice of any administrative officer.
50. This would always be implied, so, at least, it would be redundant.
51. Full age for what purpose? See note 41 supra.
52. "Chosen" by whom?
53. The provisions do not state that the guaranty business need be incidental
to the corporate purposes.
54. Suppose the shareholder is a wonan, or another corporation, then what?
55. What shares would come under such a classification? "Special" stock is not
defined or referred to in other parts of the act.
56. Does this provision, as set out in the act, mean that a Florida corporation
may not have assessable shares? This provision was carried over from former § 612.10.
Several attorneys have expressed to this author the view that this barred the issuing
of assessable shares by Florida corporations. However, in the case of Milton v.
Bergstrom, 71 Fla. 197, 70 So. 1008 (1916), the shareholders of the Florida Trust
Co. voted a resolution providing for a 25% assessment on their shares, which were
all fully paid. The Supreme Court held that the resolution was valid as a contract
where there was ample consideration, and could be enforced by a trustee ot tne
Trust Co. If a resolution by all the shareholders of a corporation is a contract and
the promise for a promise is good consideration, it would seem that a provision in
the articles authorizing assessability of the shares would be equally as effective. The
charter is often referred to as a contract among the corporate officers and shareholders.
A well-drafted statute would state whether or not shares may be made assessable.
Such uncertainty in corporation statutes is very harmful. Since the meaning
of the provision is doubtful, most corporations, although they might desire to strengthen
the credit of the corporation by making the shares assessable, would refrain from
attempting it. Any who might attempt it, could be faced with a lot of expensive
litigation if the matter were contested. Then, also, if assessability were to be allowed,
there would be no provisions establishing a guide as to procedures and limitations.
Stupid people are inclined to insist on corporation codes being "very brief." The better
corporation codes, such as those in California and Oklahoma, add flexibility to corporate
management by allowing assessability of shares, and, at the same time, provide adequate
formulas for definite procedures and adequate safeguards against abuses where shares
are made assessable.
57. The inane definition of "Amount of Capital," set out in § 608.17, is commented
upon in several instances in the body of this article. It was taken largely from
former § 612.21. All modern business corporation acts have substituted "stated capital"
and "capital surplus" or "paid in surplus" for such primitive concepts as stated in
§ 608.17
58. Is it to be implied from this that corporations without capital stock may be
organized under c. 608?
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"otherwise provided,"' 50 in the first line of Section 608.18(7); "in writing,"'2.0
in Section 608.22(2); "circuit court,"6' 1 in Section 608.29(1); "estate and
effects,"0' 2 in Section 608.29(1); "sworn report,"03 "home office," 04 "main
line of business,"0 5 "number of shares," 0 "capital stock allocated,"' ' and
"banking and trust companies," ' all in Section 608.32; "maintain an office
with a resident agent thereat,"09 in Section 608.38; "duties as may be
prescribed by the certificate of incorporation or determined by the board
of directors,"70° in Section 608.40; "kind, class or series," 71 in Section
608.42(2); "voting trusts, '72 in Section 608.43; "married women,"73 in
Section 608.46; and "intent of the parties," 74 in Section 608.48 are glaring
examples.
This list is not all-inclusive. It includes only a few of the more
obvious cxamples which stick out like a wart on a man's nose.
Section 608.03, like most of the sections in Chapter 608, as a whole
59. "Otherwise provided" where? In the by-laws, the articles, the Constitution of
the United States, the Treaty of Paris, or the Koran?
60. Suppose the shareholder registers a negative vote on a written ballot cast
at the shareholders' meeting. Would that satisfy the requirement?
61. Could this be any circuit court, say the one in Leon County, the one in
the county where the registered office is located, or the one where a branch office
is located?
62. This phrase is an oddity in the nomenclature of corporation law and accounting.
A modem dictionary or thesaurus lists the noun "effects" as having some 60 different
meanings, while "estate" is a variable with nearly half that many connotations. Is it
possible that the person who drafted the provision had never heard of the term
"assets"?
63. Doubtless means in the form of an affidavit, and not expressed in profane
language.
64. Suppose this were a Miami firm that had gone to Delaware to incorporate.
Which would be its "home office," the office of its resident agent in Dover or
Wilmington where only its duplicate stock ledger is kept, or its registered office
in Miami?
65. Suppose it lists several principal purposes in its articles and carries on many
lines of business.
66. Authorized shares, outstanding shares, fully paid shares, or what?
67. What does this mean? Capital stock is carried on the corporate books as a
liability. Certainly, it does not mean the stock certificates. If it refers to corporate
assets in this state, when would such be allocated? Would it be when resolved by
the board? When the funds are set aside for that purpose by the treasurer? Or,
only when the corporate assets are located in Florida?
68. Are not banking and trust companies governed by the Banking Code?
69. Must the corporation have one "registered office" with a registered agent
thereat? Or does § 608.38 mean that it may have another small office off in some
out-of-the-way place and locate the registered agent there?
70. Does this mean that the terms of office and duties of the corporate officers
and agents could not be fixed in by-laws adopted by the shareholders?
71. Would a holder of shares in a series have a preemptive right as to new
shares of the same class, or of the same "kind," when not of the same series?
72. This phrase is critically analyzed further over in the body of the article.
73. All of § 608.48 serves no purpose, and can only lead to confusion. Under
the Florida law, marriage does not destroy a woman's competency to contract if she
would be competent if single. Under this section, all married women become
sui furis and competent to contract in all matters concerning corporations. If married,
she can be an incorporator, director, president, shareholder, etc., although she may
be a 12-year-old bride, an alien, or a lunatic.
74. This short section is very ambiguous, especially as to what intent the parties
must have.
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is poorly drafted. In setting out the provisions which must be stated
in the articles, paragraph (2)(h) of Section 608.03, provides:
The names and post office addresses of the members of the
first board of directors, the president, the secretary and the treasurer,
who, unless otherwise provided by the articles of incorporation or
by the by-laws, shall hold office for the first year of existence of
the corporation or until their successors are elected or appointed
and have qualified.
Some corporation statutes provide that the initial board of directors
shall be named in the articles and shall control the corporate affairs
from the beginning of corporate existence until the shareholders'
organization meeting is held and a board is elected by a vote of the
shareholders, while others state that the incorporators have charge until
a board is elected at the shareholders' meeting. Some of the latter statutes
limit the functions of the incorporators during this interim to conducting
necessary affairs, including the calling and conducting of the shareholder's
organization meeting. The latter procedure is more democratic and much
more desirable. A corporation is run for the benefit of the shareholders,
and, therefore, they should control in establishing the policies and internal
set-up of the organization. It would follow that justice would require
that they be allowed to act in this regard as early as possible.
It is extremely illogical to name the officers in the articles, as is
provided in Section 608.03(2) (h). At the time the articles are drawn
up, there is no corporation. Moreover, there is no grave need for officers,
normally appointed by a board of directors, before the internal organization
is effected. No reference to such a thing as a shareholders' organization
meeting is mentioned in Chapter 608. Moreover, no provisions fixing the
time of, or requirements for, pre-incorporation subscribers becoming share-
holders are present. The act is likewise as deficient in matters for which
it does not provide as it is in what it provides.
The provision, that the three officers, president, secretary, and treasurer,
shall hold office for one year, or until their successors are elected or
appointed and have qualified, unless otherwise provided in the articles
or by-laws, is absurd. The drafters of this provision seemed to have no
knowledge of the sequence of procedural steps normally taken in the
creation and internal organization of a corporation.
Such sequence normally follows a procedure in the following order:
(1.) The promoters perform the pre-incorporation functions of planning
the organization, securing pre-incorporation subscriptions, and executing
any other promotional activities; (2.) The promoters often become the
incorporators, at least an agreement is reached between them and the
principal pre-incorporation subscribers as to who are to be the incorporators;
(3.) Then the promoters and/or the persons selected to serve as
incorporators prepare the articles, which are duly executed and delivered
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to the secretary of state by the incorporators; (4.) The incorporators, after
the articles arc approved by the secretary of state, then have control of
the affairs of the new corporation, and are to continue the preliminary
procedures, including the acceptance of any further subscriptions, receiving
any consideration from the shareholders or subscribers, and the calling
of the shareholders' organization meeting; (5.) The incorporators then
conduct the shareholders' meeting up to the time the by-laws have been
adopted and the board of directors have, under the terms of the by-laws,
been elected; (6.) 'Pie newly-elected board members, during a brief
recess of the shareholders' meeting, assemble and organize the board,
electing the officers; (7.) The board then adjourns and the new president,
as chairman, re-convenes the shareholders' meeting, and any unfinished
business is consummated. Although this is the usual order of procedure,
provisions in the statutes, charter, or choice of the parties may modify it.
It would be nonsense to have the affairs of the corporation, during
the first year of its existence, managed by a board appointed by the
promoters and/or incorporators without regard to the desires or interests
of the shareholders in general. For over a quarter of a century this
author has been teaching the most thorough and comprehensive course in
corporate procedure offered in any law school, and is the author of two
books on the subject. Thus, he feels competent to offer criticism of
the sloppy, inconsistent procedures set out in Chapter 608.
Section 608.03(2)(i) rcquires that the articles must provide that
incorporators agree "to take" the total "amount of capital with which the
corporation will begin business." The provision implies that the person
drafting it did not have the vaguest concept of the meaning of the word,
"capital." Certainly he never mastered an elementary course in either
accounting or corporation law.
Corporation statutes almost uniformly require that a certain minimum
of shares must be subscribed and the consideration therefor be paid in
before the corporation shall begin business and/or create any indebtedness
other than indebtedness for organizational expenses.75 Such provisions are
substantive and should be provided for in the substantive portion of a
corporation code. The new act does not contain either any substantive
provisions suggesting that before beginning business a corporation must
have an amount of capital paid in or that there need be any allegation
in the articles that any amount must be paid in before it begins business.
This changed the former law of Florida. The former statutes had no
mandatory substantive provisions containing such minimum paid-in amount,
but the procedural provisions required the filing of an allegation that such
had been done or would be done before the corporation could commence
business.
75. See annotations under 18 OKLA. SrAT. ANN. § 1.15.
CORPORATIONS
Section 608.03(2) (d) provides that the articles shall contain a statement
that "the amount of capital with which the corporation will begin business
which shall not be less than five hundred dollars." That could only mean
that a corporation could not begin business unless the par value of
outstanding par shares, plus the consideration received for non par shares
outstanding (whether fully paid or not) aggregated at least five hundred
dollars. It does not mention that any amount must be paid in. It
uses the word "capital" and that, as described in Section 608.17, means the
aggregate amount as set out above. The nonsensical provision in paragraph
(i) of Section 608.03(2), referred to above, does not require that the
articles state that the incorporators have or shall pay in any amount
before the corporation shall commence business. It does not even require
that they even subscribe for shares of a value of that amount or of any
amount. Section 608.03(2) (i) states that it must be alleged in the articles
that the subscriber of the articles agrees to take the aggregate of shares
"which shall not be less than the amount of capital with which the
corporation will begin business." Agrees with whom? Must they allege
that there is a binding contract to take certain shares? Even if there were
such a binding contract, it would be an executory contract to subscribe
for such shares in the future.
Moreover, the provision, as worded, is ridiculous. Very often people
organizing a corporation know that all or a large amount of the authorized
shares must be subscribed for and the consideration therefor paid in
before the business is launched if the enterprise is to be assured of success.
It doubtless would be impossible to interest such persons in the enterprise
unless they were assured that the necessary funds to succesfully launch
the company would be available before business was begun. Their best
means of assurance would be to demand that the articles provide that
the amount be all paid in prior to commencing business. If we assume
that the authorized capital of the company were $1,000,000, and the
demanded allegation in the charter be that all the authorized capital
be paid in before the company could begin business, what would we have?
We would have a situation where it would have to be alleged in the
articles that the "subscriber of the articles of incorporation" [whoever
he is meant to be in Section 608(2) (i)] agrees to take the entire $1,000,000
of shares.
In a single article it would be impossible to thoroughly analyze and
discuss the multitude of foibles appearing in House Bill 1125. Thus,
from here on it will be necessary to limit the discussion to a summary
form, and, even then, space will not permit a mention of many of the
peccabilitics lurking in almost every sentence throughout Chapter 608. The
most wary corporation attorney will not be able to decipher many of
these enigmas when he detects them; a solution can only come, in each
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instance, through court interpretation, which means much delay and much
expense.
Section 608.07 provides that the board may adopt by-laws unless
the articles provide otherwise. Since the board's function is to conduct
the affairs of the corporation and the by-laws are to serve as a guide in
fixing policies of the corporation, including the scope of the authority
to be exercised by the board, the board should have authority to tamper
with the by-laws only when such authority is specifically delegated to it
by the shareholders. Such blanket authority should not be crystalized
in the charter, but should be left to the shareholders to determine from
time to time to meet current circumstances. Of course, this might all be
set out in the articles. However, the articles should be kept as short
as possible, and furthermore, the matter might be overlooked in drafting
the articles. After all, a corporation is run for the benefit of the share-
holders, so why give a self-serving group-which the board often turns out
to be-the right to fix the rules regulating its authority and conduct?
Section 608.07, however, does provide that the board's power in
adopting or amending the by-laws is limited to such changes as are
"not inconsistent with any by-laws that may have been adopted by the
stockholders." This provision is ambiguous in two ways. First, it does
not extend the power of the board to amend or adopt all by-laws that
are not inconsistent with those which actually had been adopted by the
shareholders. The shareholders have authority to adopt, and may have
adopted, in so far as is lawful, any or every by-law imaginable. Then,
the directors would not have the power or authority to adopt or amend
any by-law, as there would be none other than those which the shareholders
could (may) have adopted. Second, it does not indicate whether or
not the shareholders would have the authority to amend or repeal a
by-law previously adopted by the board. 'When the board has authority
to meet and adopt a self-serving by-law and then proceed to exercise
authority thereby granted to it without any approval by the shareholders,
an opportunity to commit abuse is presented. Much harm could result
before the next shareholders' meeting from acts which were entirely
contrary to the desire of the shareholders in general. It would especially
be vicious if the shareholders could not, when they did meet, change or
repeal the by-law adopted by the board. The act doesn't say that
they can.
Then to add more to this "comedy of inconsistencies," Section
608.57 provides that in the event the directors hold over beyond the first
year without adopting by-laws "to enable the stockholders to hold the
annual election of directors," any corporate acts performed by them
during the hold-over "shall be fraudulent and void." In what sort of a
situation would that leave the corporation, as well as innocent parties
who may have dealt with the corporation during that time? Moreover,
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if the directors are authorized to adopt by-laws, does that mean that
there could be no shareholders' meeting until the directors authorized such
a meeting by so providing in a by-law adopted by the board? That is
super-nonsense. The well-established principle that there should be a
shareholders' organization meeting as soon after incorporation as reasonably
possible should not be abrogated. At that meeting the shareholders
have the opportunity to complete the internal set-up of the corporation,
including the adopting of by-laws (or delegating the power to adopt them
to the board), electing directors, approving (or disapproving) promoters'
contracts, etc., etc. The shareholders should have control over the fixing of
the date of the annual shareholders' meeting. That is a matter that
concerns the shareholders directly and should not be transferred to the
board. Moreover, the shareholders should have the right to call a
general shareholders' meeting at any time by giving proper notice, etc.
Apparently, under the new act directors can only be elected at an annual
shareholders' meeting, since Section 608.08 states that the directors of
every corporation shall be chosen at the annual meeting of the shareholders.
More nonsense is contained in Sections 608.11 and 608.12. The
provisions in the former section are more than nonsense; they are dangerously
bad. Such provisions are not found in the statutes of any other jurisdiction
and have no place in any corporation statutes. These provisions were
carried over from the repealed section, Section 611.20. Section 608.11 reads:
Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, or
in the by-laws, when stockholders who hold four-fifths of the voting
stock having the right and entitled to vote at any meeting shall
be present at such meeting, however called or notified, and shall
sign a written consent thereto on record of the meeting, the
acts of such meeting shall be as valid as if legally called and
notified.
These provisions, as they appear in the new act, are in one way
less mischievous than those in Section 611.20, while in other ways they
are more culpable. The stipulation that says that their effect may
be negatived by providing otherwise in the articles or by-laws is in favor
of the new section, but, on the other hand, the old section only applied
to the limited types of corporations organized under Chapter 611. Since
1925 most corporations have been formed under Chapter 612, and that
chapter contained no such provisions. The new act applies to all types
of corporations which were formerly controlled by Sections 610, 611, and 612.
Moreover, the new act requires the attendance and consent of the holders
of four-fifths of only the voting stock, while the former provisions appeared
to require the presence and consent of the holders of four-fifths of all
the shares. It is a well-established principle of law that there cannot be
a valid meeting without a valid call and notice of such meeting.
Even under the new provisions the incorporators might deliberately
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refrain from negativing the evil effects possible under such provisions by
failing to "otherwise provide" in the articles. They might then name
themselves as the first board of directors (as is possible under Chapter
608), and then refuse to "otherwise provide" in the by-laws. This would
give them the power to disfranchise the holders of an entire class of stock
which did not exceed twenty per cent of the voting shares. Under normal
statutes where cumulative voting is provided, that percentage of shares
could elect one member of a five-member board. In a situation, which
is permitted under this act, they could be denied the right to even be
present so as to know what was going on. Moreover, by oversight the
incorporators, the board, or shareholders might omit any "otherwise"
provisions. Then, the section is also ambiguous as to how the holders
of proxies are to be treated and what is to be the effect of waivers of
notice of meeting. Could proxies be counted in making up the four-fifths?
That is, would the shareholder be "present" when represented by proxy?
Also, would a waiver be considered the same as having notice and being
present? Usually that is the effect of the waiver of notice. The shareholders
signing a waiver could at the same time sign a record of their consent.
The provisions in Section 608.12 are equally undesirable. They do
not state whether the holders of thirty per cent of the shares required
for petitioning a county judge to force the calling of a shareholders'
meeting are to be the holders of thirty per cent of all of the outstanding
shares or just thirty per cent of the voting stock; whether the county
judge must be of the county where the registered office is located or
whether he might be any other county judge in or out of the state,
that is, a county judge in a far corner of Florida or a county judge in
Maine, Oregon, or Hawaii; nor does the wording indicate by whom the
presiding officer is to be "chosen." Ten per cent of the shareholders
should be enough to validly call a shareholders' meeting. Thirty per
cent is too much. Such a percentage would make it impossible to thus
call a meeting when there are a large number of shareholders who are
widely scattered.
Now we come to the questions as to whether or not cumulative
voting now may be had in Florida? If so, must it be provided in the
articles? Or would a shareholder have the right to vote his shares
cumulatively unless forbidden in the articles? Such voting is important,
and in most states and territories, there may be cumulative voting if so
provided in the articles. Many states grant the right unless denied in
the articles, and twenty states deem that public policy requires that voting
be cumulative, and therefore require it by law. Some, like Illinois, have
a constitutional provision requiring it.
Section 608.03(2) (g), provides that the articles must set out "the
number of directors, which shall not be less than three," and Section
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608.09(t) provides that "the business of every corporation shall be managed
and its corporate powers exercised by a board of not less than three
directors." Then in Section 608.09(2) it is provided that the board may
designate two or more of its members as an executive committee which
"shall have and may exercise the powers of the board of directors." If
that be true, the corporation would not be managed by a board of three.
It is a well-settled principle of corporation law that an executive committee
does not exercise the powers of the board. The executive committee is
made up of members who are agents of and accountable to the board
the same as the members of any other committee, or other agents.
Moreover, unless it is so provided in the articles, the board should not
be permitted to appoint an executive committee except by a unanimous
vote of the board. Board members are elected to manage the corporation
and Section 608.09 so requires. The board should not be allowed to
circumvent that principle by delegating its authority to a minority group.
Suppose there are five or more members, say, nine members, on the
board; then if five members were present there would be a quorum. Now,
suppose a majority of those five present voted to appoint two of themselves
as an executive committee. That would disqualify the other seven
members. At least six of them may have not wanted an executive
committee. The two that were there at the meeting may have voted
against it and the other four may not have favored it, while by some
necessity they Were unable to attend the meeting. Thus, the control of
the corporation would be in the hands of two directors and the seven
other members might be held responsible for malfeasance in the corporate
management while being unable to prevent it. Moreover, the act provides
no method whereby the directors may dissolve the executive committee,
once it is appointed.
The provisions as to publication notices upon calling meeting and
closing of the corporate books are more or less valueless. Especially is
that true where it is not required as in Section 608.10, that the newspaper
carrying the notice have any circulation in the city or county where the
corporation's registered office is located.
Section 608.10(3) provides that unless otherwise provided in the
articles, each shareholder shall have one vote for each share recorded in
his name on the books of the company. Under Section 608.43, providing
for so-called "voting trusts," the title to shares placed in such a so-called
voting trust remains in the owner and he is listed as owner on the
records of the company. From those combined provisions it must be
implied that the owner would have the right to vote the shares in spite
of the voting trust. The so-called voting-trust arrangement in Section
608.43, is not a voting trust; it is in the nature of a voting pool. How
could there be a trustee when he did not have the legal title? A trust
implies the separation of the legal title from the equitable ownership.
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Subsection (5) of Section 608.10 is likewise ambiguous and inconsistent
in its provisions relating to voting by proxy. Thereunder, may a voting
trustee execute a valid proxy? No time limit is placed on proxies. This
is out of line with statutes in other states. When no time limit is fixed
in a proxy, it should be limited to voting in one annual shareholders'
meeting. Statutes in some states have accomplished this by limiting the
life of the proxy to eleven months when no time is specified in the
proxy. Also, no provision is made as to how shares are to be voted if
there is a joint proxy and the proxy holders are evenly split on how the
shares are to be voted. Statutes should provide that, where there is a
deadlock, each faction could vote his fraction of the shares. That is, if
the deadlock were between two, each would vote one-half of the shares,
and if deadlocked three ways, each would vote a third.
Section 608.13, dealing with corporate powers, is a monstrosity in more
than a dozen ways. First, it covers the same general scope as Section
610.03, which was not repealed. In fact, much of it was copied from
610.03. Second, it provides that the corporate powers (which are listed
in Section 610.03 as "inherent corporate powers") may be altered or
limited in the by-laws. Corporate powers are granted by the state and
cannot be altered ex parte. They are a part of a contract with the state,
and can only be limited by provisions in the articles. The by-laws are not
filed with the state nor are they a part of the contract between the
corporation and the state, while the articles are. Such a provision indicates
that the party drafting the provision had no concept of the functions of
the by-laws. The by-laws serve to regulate the internal affairs of the
corporation. A knowledge of their contents are imputed to the shareholders
but not to the state. The draftsman of the provision did not know the
difference between powers granted by the state and authority extended
to the officers, etc., by the corporation. Section 610.03 merely stated,
"Unless otherwise provided," certain corporate powers were to be had.
This was somewhat ambiguous, that is, would be to the layman, but
anyone with a slight knowledge of corporation law would know that it
meant, "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation."
Third, the way Section 608.13(2) reads, it would be implied that a
corporation could appear in court, through its agents (although they be
laymen), and prosecute and defend suits involving the corporation the same
as a "natural person." Imagine courts permitting that! Fourth, the word
"natural," when referring to a physical persons is fallacious. A physical
person is no more a natural legal person than is a corporation. A slave
is a natural person and only becomes a legal person when he is emancipated.
His legal personality originates from the operation of law. The same is
true of a corporation; the law simply attaches a legal personality to a
group. When we speak of a "separate legal personality," it means that
the group, like an individual, may, through its agents, commit acts which
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will have legal consequences, without attaching liability to individuals in
the group.
Fifth, in the first subsections of the section, powers which are inherent
in all corporations are listed. That is, all corporations have those powers
irrespective of the provisions in the articles setting out its purpose or
purposes. The balance of the powers are incidental powers-incidental to
the carrying out the object or objects for which the corporation is
organized; the section should so state.
Sixth, subsection (6) implies that the number of directors may be
increased or decreased by stipulations in the by-laws. The number of
directors are fixed in the articles and cannot be changed except by an
amendment of the articles. It's nonsense to suggest the number of directors
can be altered by a change in the by-laws.
Seventh, subsection (8)(a) states that corporations may deal in
corporate franchises in this state and other jurisdictions. Could a peanut
vending corporation buy the franchise of the Seaboard Railway, of the
WkTVJ television station, of a Florida state bank, of the City of Miami,
or of Attorney X or Doctor Y? It is absurd to say that a corporation can
traffic in franchises granted to individuals or corporations. A franchise
is a grant by the sovereign to a group, association, or other unit. It is a
contract between the sovereign and such grantee. Does this provision
mean that the State of Florida is surrendering up all control over such
franchises and throwing them on the market to be bought and sold by
corporations the same as cans of beans or sacks of meal? Paragraph (b)
states that the purchase of the assets of a firm also passes the franchise
to engage in that business, and paragraph (c) further provides that
corporations can traffic in licenses. The same objections apply to the
latter as to bartering in franchises. Could the board of directors of a
corporation organized to print and distribute bible tracts purchase and
operate a whiskey distillery?
Eighth, subsection (9) (a) states that a corporation may guarantee all
kinds of securities of other corporations. All of these should be limited
to those that come under powers incidental to carrying out the purpose
or purposes stated in the articles. Suppose a corporation chartered to
manufacture lollipops were to engage in the guaranty business. Would
that be incidental to producing lollipops? Certainly not. Moreover, such
guaranty operations would clash with the provisions in the laws relating
to banking, insurance, and guaranty companies. The reasons why courts
have uniformly denied to corporations the power to enter into general
partnerships is that it would be hazarding the investments of the shareholders
to the risk resulting from the company's becoming a surety.
Ninth, subsection (9) (b) authorizes a corporation to purchase its
own shares, but such purchase must be paid from surplus. Suppose
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the shares are redeemable shares and the company cancels them. 'Would
the surplus be that over the liabilities and outstanding capital before the
shares are retired or the liabilities plus the outstanding capital liability after
they are retired? Here again the act uses the single word, "capital," which
is described in Section 608.17. "Capital" as defined there, as heretofore
stated, means the aggregate of the par value of outstanding par shares,
whether paid for or not, plus the aggregate of consideration actually
received for outstanding non par shares, whether they are fully paid or not.
Tenth, subsection (I1) (a), coupled with the repeal of Section 612.62,
has created uncertainty which is already in the Florida courts for solution.
Paragraph (a), in part, provides that a corporation shall have power to
icontract debts and borrow money at such rates of interest and upon
such terms as it, or its board of directors, may deem necessary or expedient."
This provision was taken from Section 610.04, which in turn, except for
slight changes in wording, dates back to the Laws of 1903, Chapter 5219.
In 1925, Section 612.62, which provides that corporations could not plead
usury as a defense, was adopted. In 1935, the case of Matlack Properties, Inc.
v. Citizens' & Southern National Bank"' came before the Florida Supreme
Court. The question presented was whether a corporation organized prior
to the adoption of the 1925 act could plead usury as a defense. The court
held, that since Section 5970, Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927, empowered
corporations "to borrow such sums of money at such rates of interest,
and upon such terms as the company or its board of directors shall
authorize or agree upon and may deem necessary and proper," the corporation
had the legal right to borrow money at any interest rate that it deemed
proper, and therefore usury could not be pleaded. The court could have
reached the same result by holding that Section 612.62 was general in
scope and procedural in nature, and, therefore, it barred the defense of
usury.
House Bill 1125 repealed Section 612.62, and re-enacted the provision
giving power to corporations to borrow money and fix the interest rates,
from the earlier statutes as set out above. Now the question has to be
carried to the supreme court to determine whether a corporation organized
under Chapter 612 can plead usury as a defense in a cause of action
which arose since H.B. 1125 became effective on October 1.
In a Dade County case a corporation on October 1 executed and
delivered notes providing for a rate of interest which was usurous tnder
the general usury statutes of Florida. The notes were demand instruments
and the payee demanded payment on them and then brought suit. The
defendant corporation set up the plea of usury. The circuit court ruled
against the defendant corporation, and its attorney has advised this author
that the case is being appealed to the supreme court. If the provision
76. 120 Fla. 77, 162 So. 148 (1935).
CORPORATIONS
in 612.62 were substantive, the defendant does not have a chance to win.
But if it were procedural, the corporation may win,-unless the Supreme
Court holds that the powers provision in Section 608 (11)(a) excludes
corporations from coming under the general usury statute. Why was this
matter "left up in the air" when one short sentence, stating whether or
not a corporation might plead usury as a defense, inserted in Chapter
608, would have settled it?76a.
It is believed that the general content of Section 608.14 establishes an
all-time high in ridiculous inconsistencies. After providing that a
corporation may issue only such shares as are authorized in the certificate
of incorporation, it further stipulates that such authorized shares may be
par common with the value fixed in the certificate of incorporation,
non par common, and preferred, each of which "may consist of two
or more kinds, which may be divided into classes and classes into series,
and each kind, class and series may have such distinguishing characteristics,
including designations, preferences or restrictions as regards dividends,
redemption, voting powers or restrictions or qualifications of voting powers
as shall be stated in the certificate of incorporation."
Does this mean that corporations can have par and non par common
stock but not so with preferred? Also, what is meant by "kinds" of
shares? It might be said that par and non par, or common and preferred,
might be "kinds" of stock. But here each of these may be divided
into "kinds." "Classes" is a common designation of shares, but this
author does not recall any statutory provision stating that par or non-par,
or common or preferred, shares may be divided into kinds, followed by
subdivisions into classes and series.
If all of the attributes of the shares are set out in the articles, as
provided in subsection (1), there would be no attributes to be fixed by
the board or shareholders as to any series. The author of the provisions
in this subsection apparently had no concept of the connotation of series
of shares. If all the attributes of shares are set out in the articles,
it would be impossible to divide the shares into series, as the term is
used in modern business corporation acts. In series attributes (although
76a. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circtut court in the case
referred to. Sodi, Inc. v. Salitan, 68 So.2d 882 (decided Dec. 8, 1953, and reported
in the Southern Reporter advance sheet of Jaii. 28, 1954, while the manuscript of
this article was in the hands of the publisher). The trial court had overruled the
plaintiff's motion to strike the affirmative defense of usury set up by the defendant
to defeat recovery on the obligation and a foreclosure of a chattel mortgage securing
same. In his opinion justice Drew failed to discover the real issue involved, and
based his holding on an imaginary distinction between the provisions in § 608.13
and those in § 610.04. There was no fundamental difference between the law
applied in the Matlack Properties case, see note 76 supra, and that in the applicable
provisions in c. 608. The provision, "unless otherwise provided by its certificate
of incorporation or by law," added nothing. All corporate powers are granted by law,
and any limitations in law will impliedly limit such powers, and so in the absence
of any specific declaration of such rule being specifically set out in the statutes. The
reasoning in the case is based upon extremely illogical grounds.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
sometimes limited to those attributes which directly affect the price and
marketability) are left, as to each respective series, to be fixed by the
shareholders or directors-usually by the latter. The fixing of the
attributes is governed largely by the market. Series implies that the
attributes of the shares are left "open" and not fixed in the articles.
Similar provisions, as those in this subsection, are also found in Sections
608.03 ( 2 )(e) and 60818 (6).
Then when we come to subsection (2) of Section 608.14, we find that
preferred and special77 stock may be issued in series. Such a provision
is contrary to the provisions in subsection (I ); the provisions of the two
subsections can in no way be reconciled. Subsection (1) states that
"characteristics, including designations, prefercnces or restrictions as regards
dividends, redemption," etc., must be stated in the articles, while subsection
(2) gives carte blanche authority to not only the board but to an executive
committee in fixing the attributes as to dividends and redemption of
the respective series. How could such be done if the attributes arc
established in the articles? Also, it mentions that the shares "of any
class may be divided by number from time to time into and issued in
designated series . . . as shall be stated . . . in the certificate of
incorporation." How could this be done without amending the charter
in each instance? The author who formulated the provisions in this
section, indeed, had an imagination. However, it may have resulted from
what he lacked, rather than from what he had.
The provisions of subsection (3) are equally absurd. Section 608.18
provides that every amendment of the certificate "shall be approved by
the board of directors, proposed by them to the stockholders and approved
at a stockholders' meeting by such proportion, not less than a majority,
of the stock entitled to vote thereon as may be provided in the certificate
of incorporation." Tlen, in subsection (3) of Section 608.14, it is provided
that the certificate of incorporation may be amended by a resolution of
an executive committee, which may be made up of as few as two numbers,
who need not be shareholders of the corporation or even citizens of the
United States.
Another example of ludicrousness is the provision in subsection (3),
leaving it optional as to whether or not the board or executive committee
is to file with the secretary of state the resolution fixing the attributes
of series. Apparently, there would be no difference in the legal effect
whether such filing were done or not. After reading Section 608.14, tis
author wonders if any of the group of assistants in the attorney general's
office who worked on the draft ever had taken a course in corporation law.
Space will not permit the setting out of the multitude of foibles
contained in all of the sections from Section 608.15 to the end of the
77. See note 55 supra,
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act. The entire act, section by section, has been fully examined, and
about the same quality of draftsmanship with equivalent inanity of content
prevails throughout the entire balance of Chapter 608.
111. VOID SPOTS LrFr IN NEW STATUTES
The deficiencies, void spots, and omissions remaining in the Florida
corporation statutes are quite as noisome as the inane provisions constituting
the portions adopted. In listing such insalubrious deficiencies, the
fragmentary structure of House Bill 1125, (Chapter 608, Florida Laws 1953,
Chapter 28170), a contrast will be drawn between the completeness of
the new act and the comprehensiveness of the draft presented by this
author to the legislature for considcration. Although this author's draft
is the latest and more comprehensive than any of the modern business
corporation codes now in effect in any of the states, its streamlined form,
advanced legal concepts, unambiguous phraseology, safeguards against
abuses, modern procedures, and thorough coverage follow the general
pattern of the other dozen or more existing modern acts. It contains a
very, very few innovations which have not been tested and tried by actual
operations in the statutory law of other jurisdictions. Its characteristics,
distinguishing it from many of the other modem business corporation
codes, are its comprehensiveness and the more corefully-formulated provisions
dealing with the more recent developments and modern day "tension
points" in the field of corporation law. The author's draft and other modern
busincss corporation codes will be used as a standard, and only matters
fully covered in thcm will be referred to as deficiencies in the new Florida act.
The new Florida corporation act unlike the modern business
corporation codes, is deficient in the following matters: 8
I. It has no short title.
2. It has no definitions section worthy of consideration.
3. It has no "savings clause."
4. It has no provisions reserving and limiting the power of the state
to alter or revoke charter powers.




d) their liability, and
e) the records of their transactions.
78. Space will not permit a footnote setting out the citation and discussion of
each provision in the draft of the proposed Florida Business Corporation Code prepared
by this author, and other modern acts, dealing with the matters which are omitted in
c. 608 but included in the other codes. Most of the deficiencies are taken care
of in the Oklahoma Act, and the respective provisions therein are followed, in each
instance, by elaborate notes and anotations. See 18 OKIA. SrA'r. A-4N. §§I.I to
1.250 (1953).
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6. It contains no regulatory provisions pertaining to the incorporators,
as to-
a) their duties,
b) their authority, and
c) their liability.
7. It contains no provisions for changing the corporate name.
8. It contains no provision for reserving a corporate name.
9. It does not afford adequate protection of the corporate name.
10. It has no provision for the transfer of the corporate name.
11. It sets out no well-stated formula concerning condition precedents
to beginning business or creating corporate indebtedness.
12. It does not contain adequate provisions for keeping of corporate
records, and providing penalties for failing to do so.
33. It has no provision denying the right to use lack of corporate
capacity as a defense.
14. It has no provisions stating that public corporate records shall
not constitute constructive notice concerning limitations upon
corporate powers as to third parties.
15. It does not limit the general corporate powers to acts incidental
or expedient to carrying out the purposes expressed in the articles.
16. It does not extend to corporations the authority and power to
make donations to public or eleemosynary causes.
17. It does not provide that corporations shall have authority and
power to contribute to civic, business, and trade associations.
18. It does not deny to corporations the authority and power to
make political contributions.
19. It does not authorize a corporation to reimburse its officers who
successfully defend in a derivative suit.
20. It does not adequately state the powers and authority granted
by the articles.
21. It does not adequately state the scope of the authority limited by
the articles.
22. It contains no provision definitely denying to corporations the
privilege to plead usury as a defense.
23. It does not purport to abrogate ultra vires as a defense.
24. It has no provision relating to the terms, revocability, payments
and calls as to subscriptions.
25. It does not adequately provide for the enforcement of payment
upon calls and assessments.
26. It has no provisions regulating and fixing the procedure in
authorizing, levying, and enforcing assessments.
27. It is vague on whether shares may be made assessable.
28. It does not adequately fix and protect preemptive rights of
shareholders.
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29. It does not duly regulate the issuing of conversion rights and
options.
30. It makes no provisioIs for employees' sharc-ownership plaits.
31. It fails to provide for a shareholders' organization mneeting.
32. It does not provide for the preparation of voting lists.
33. It is deficient in not providing for voting-
a) shares jointly held,
b) fractional shares,
c) shares held by fiduciary,
d) pledged shares,
e) by creditors when articles so provide, and
f) shares cumulatively.
34. It does not provide for inspectors of elections.
35. It does not adequately set out the duties and liabilities of directors.
36. It contains no provisions for removal of directors or other officers
and agents.
37. It does not adequately provide for and regulate inspection of
corporate records-
a) by the state,
b) by the directors and officers,
c) by the shareholders,
d) by others entitled to represent shares,
e) by trust certificate holders,
f) by creditors, and
g) by the public.
38. It does not adequately provide for levying upon shares when the
share certificate cannot be attached.
39. It does not provide for labor shares.
40. It does not adequately provide for the payment of consideration
for shares.
41. It does not provide for promotional or reorganizational expenses.
42. It does not provide for a true "stated capital" and "capital surplus,"
or for safeguards and distribution thereof.
43. It does not authorize allocation of portions of consideration or
non par shares to capital surplus.
44. It does not adequately provide for liability of directors and
shareholders for unlawful issue of shares.
45. It does not adequately provide for the execution and contents of
share certificates.
46. It lacks in providing adequate formulas permitting flexibility in
payments of dividends, while at the same time giving adequate
protection to creditors and preferred shareholders.
47. It inadequately regulates redemptions of shares.
48. It does not adequately regulate the purchase of treasury shares.
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49. It is woefully deficient in not setting up safeguards to protect
creditors and holders of preference shares against unwarranted
payments to shareholders.
50. It encourages under-capitalization without giving adcquatc pro-
tection to creditors and preferred shareholders.
51. It does not allow ample flexibility in conducting corporate affairs.
52. It does not provide for payment of dividends or capital distribution
when wasting assets.
53. It does not adequately fix liability and provide for penalties when
corporate funds are unlawfully paid out or received.
54, It does not set out definite procedures for recovery when types of
malfeasance have been committed.
55. It does not purport to discourage unfounded derivative suits by
requiring either-
a) the plaintiff to have been a shareholder when the alleged
wrong was committed,
b) the plaintiff to either own a certain amount of shares or
put up a bond for costs and damages if the suit proves to be
groundless,
c) a verified allegation that there was no collusion, or
d) that such suit could not bc compromised or dismissed
without approval of the court.
56. It does not deny or regulate loans and other dealings between
the corporation and the directors.
57, It does not abolish the troublesome de facto corporation.
58. It does not authorize the incorporators to amend the articles any
time before the corporation has allotted any shares and/or com-
menced business.
59. It does not require a sufficiently large enough affirmative vote of
the shareholders to afford adequate safeguards against abuses in
authorizing an amendment of the articles.
60. It does not properly authorize shares of a class to vote as a class
in authorizing an amendment of the articles.
61. It does not authorize all shares to have voting rights, any limitations
on voting in the articles notwithstanding, when shareholders are
voting on the authorization of an amendment of the articles
which make such specified changes in the Corporate set-up as to
affect fundamentally all shareholders' rights.'
62. It does not enumerate fundamental changes effected by amend-
ments of the articles which affect the shares of a class adversely
so as to authorize the holders of shares of such class to vote as a
class in authorizing such amendment.
63. It does not require that the written notice of any meeting at which
the shareholders are to vote on the authorization of an amendment
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of the articles shall include a copy of the amendment, or a
summary thereof, to be voted upon.
64. It does not extend to shareholders the right to dissent when the
voting on amendments of the articles effecting fundamental
changes in the corporate set-up, other than when authorizing a
merger or consolidation.
65. It does not authorize the extending or limiting, with safeguards
being provided, the right to dissent by so providing in the
articles.
66. It does not require that the value of the dissenters' shares must
be fixed and such shares paid for before the corporate change
can be consummated.
67. It does not provide for an amendment of the articles by the
board of directors in such matters as-
a) to change the registered office,
b) to change or appoint a registered agent, or
c) to fix the attributes of and allot new series of shares.
68. It does not place adequate limitations on the sale, etc., of all
or substantially all of the corporate assets.
69. Although its provisions on mergers and consolidations are not as
inane as most of the balance of the chapter's content, they are
woefully deficient when compared with most other modern drafts.
70. It contains no provisions authorizing a compromise arrangement
in effecting a reorganization.
71. It does not provide for an adjustment of the articles to conform
to a reorganization decree of a federal court.
72. It does not provide for a revival and restoration of a corporation
after it has expired.
73. It does nol provide for an extension of the period of duration.
74. It (hoes not provide for a reincorporation upon the purchase of
the assets and franchise of another corporation.
75. It does not adequately provide for different methods in effecting
a dissolution.
76. It does not provide for dissolution by the incorporators before
any shares have been allotted and/or the corporation has begun
business.
77. It does not set out a simple method of dissolving and winding
up a corporation upon the expiration of the corporate existence.
78. It does not adequately provide for dissolution when bankruptcy
or insolvency.
79. It does not provide an alternative method of dissolution, viz., by
unanimous consent of the shareholders, and by approval of the
shareholders upon a resolution of the board.
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80. It does not provide for the execution and filing of an intent to
dissolve.
81. It does not provide for a decree of dissolution by a court after
winding up.
82. It does not provide for a revocation of steps in voluntary dissolution.
83. It does not provide for the removal and appointment of directors
during dissolution proceedings.
84. It does not adequately provide for distribution of assets upon
dissolution and the protection of creditors, shareholders, etc.
85. It does not provide for deposit and distribution upon dissolution
of portions of assets belonging to claimants when proceeds disputed,
unclaimed, or claimants unknown.
86. It does not fix liability of parties for malfeasance in the winding up.
87. It does not specify grounds and proceedings for involuntary
dissolution.
88. It does not state who may institute involuntary dissolution
proceedings.
89. It does not set out a definite statutory procedure for involuntary
dissolution.
90. It does not fix the jurisdiction and supervision in an involuntary
dissolution.
91. It does not state the grounds authorizing a proceeding by the state
to forfeit a corporate franchise, or outline the procedural steps.
92. It has no provisions for allowing a broad flexibility in shifting the
proceeding into or out of court at expedient stages during the
process of dissolution,
93. It leaves the archaic statutory provisions relating to foreign
corporations without revision or modernization.
94. It does not state the effect or any penalties for transacting business
in the state without domestication.
95. It is very deficient in not adequately setting out the requisites
as to the content, execution, and filing of the various corporate
instruments.
96. It does not require that duplicate copies of instruments filed in
the office of the secretary of state be filed in the county where the
registered office is located.
97. It does not require a final report upon the expiration of corporate
existence, or specify its contents or method of execution.
98. It does not provide that iii a civil action corporate existence is
presumed unless a verified denial.
99. It does not provide for judicial notice of matters concerning
corporations.
100. It does not require the attorney general to supply opinions to
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the secretary of state or otherwise fix the duties of the attorney
general in matters relating to interpretation of corporation laws.
101. It, and other acts passed by the 34th Legislature, leave matters
to be administered by state officials, rather than governing them
by statutory law.
102. It does not provide for a direct appeal, to the circuit court when
adverse rulings are made by the secretary of state.
103. It does not employ modern terminology or lawyer-like phraseology.
104. It lacks a logical, orderly arrangement; its subject matter is badly
jumbled."
79. All of these conflicting provisions and void spots in the Florida corporation
statutes are certain to have a retarding effect upon corporate development in this
state. It would be well for the citizens of Florida to investigate the effects which
modem business corporation codes are having on the commercial and industrial progress
in other states. Let us notice California, for instance. In Past and Present Cortoration
Law: Is Florida In Step? 2 MIAMI L.Q. 69, 124 (1947), this author had this
to say about corporate development under the California Business Corporation Code:
In 1929, California had fewer corporate enterprises in proportion to its
population and wealth than any other state in the Union, and this, in view
of the fact that that state had an ideal climate, plenty of resources, and was
strategically located as to unlimited markets. It had but one limitation and
that was the artificial barrier resulting from its archaic legal restraints.
Its legal sanctions prevented corporations from entering the state.
It remained for Professor Ballantine to inaugurate a campaign to modernize
the corporation laws of that state. lie carried on a relentless battle which
finally culminated in an amendment to the state constitution, removing
the provision which subjected all shareholders to a pro rata liability for all
debts of the corporation, and the drafting and adoption of a complete and
most modern business corporation code. Since that time industry has been
flowing into California at an amazing rate. That state is far outstripping the
other 47 states in the degree of growth of corporate enterprises. Now, after
slightly over a decade and a half, it is rapidly becoming a great industrial
empire. Huge new aircraft industries dotted her coast-line during the war.
Some suggested that that was but a temporary mushroom-growth resulting
from the war boom. But that was not the case. Those factories have been
enlarged and converted into permanent peacetime production. And many
more new plants have been built since the close of the war. Today many more
industrial workers are employed in California than at the peak of war production.
The rate at which new wealth is being created by this great galaxy of
Pacific Coast industries is indeed baffling.
What has California got that Florida hasn't got! Industry is shifting
southward at a rapid clip. Industrial production in the South has tripled
since 1939. Is Florida getting her share? Consider the fertile markets right
at her doorstep to the south. It is true that some corporate enterprises are
invading the northern portion of this state, but any marked movement to
the ideal setting in South Florida has not materialized. This state can
well take a tip from the results accomplished by California. If the theme
of this article meets with a satisfactory response, these authors are willing
to take upon themselves the task of presenting to the next session of the
legislature the most modem and complete business corporation act yet
drafted. As asked in the title of this article: Is Florida in step!
According to the November 1953 issue of "Dunn's Statistical Review" at page 6,
during the last quarter of 1952 and the first three quarters of 1953, a total of 9,248
new corporations were organized in that state. California now ranks second to New
York in the number of new firms being incorporated. Moreover, most of the new
California corporations have a sizable capital structure; they are not "chickadee"
corporations with a total capitalization of $500 each.
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In conclusion, this author does not agree with the contention which
has been advanced by several persons that the Florida statutory corporation
law was deliberately fouled up from beginning to end in order to create
more litigation so as to provide more fees for attorneys. The causes lic
deeper than that. Most corporate litigation will be handled by the
more compctcnt corporate lawyers, and as far as this author knows such
lawyers had no part in the formulation of the new revisionary act. First,
it must be admitted that the act was very poorly drafted, and, second,
in the form it was in, it should never have been enacted into law. We
shall now attempt to analyze the causes of these two foibles.
Two main elements contributed to the faulty drafting in this instance.
First, there was the time element. The matter was delayed until there
was not available time for the drafting of a competent corporation code.
And, second, the task was assigned to persons lacking in experience in
statutory drafting and very limited in their knowledge of modern statutory
corporation law. Of course, no harm would have resulted, except for a
waste of an amount of the tax-payers' money, had the draft not been
enacted into law. Thus, the legislative function requires examination.
This author is well aware of the fact that the entire blame for the
adoption of the faulty legislation cannot be charged entirely against
the legislature. The blame must be attributcd to several factors, some
of which arc beyond legislative control. This author is far from being
critical of legislators as a group. He has had the privilege of working
with legislators a great deal, and, in doing so, he has found them to be
a diligent, conscientious group of citizcts. The real fault lies in thc
defective set-Up in the administrative and legislative machinery into which
our state goverinnent has drifted. The time allotted to our legislative
sessions is entirely too short when the broad ramifications of modern-day
legislative problems are to be carefully considered. Hundreds of bills
are dumped into the legislative hopper. Most of the bills are backed by
various pressure-grotps. The individual legislators, irrespective of their
conscientious efforts, are overwhelmed by the pressure of all of the
pending legislation. As a result, the legislature is left to the mercy of
having to rely upon recommendations of incompetent, and often self-
serving, state administrative officials. In most instances, the legislators
are to be commended on their accomplishments, as limited as they often
are, while struggling under such adverse circumstances.
It may be well to mention some of the problems confronting the
courts when they are called upon to interpret faulty legislation. Much
litigation is bound to arise under this new legislation, and a large part
of the problems involved will fall within the multitudes of enumerated
void spots left in the sphere of corporation law. The courts will
be left without any sort of a statutory yardstick to use as a guide
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in working out the solution in such instances. Moreover, problems will
be quite as difficult when they fall squarely within the statutory regulations
which arc ambiguous and conflicting. Courts are supposed to interpret
statutes as they read, and should not be forced to try to guess what may
have been in the mind of an incompetent novice when he was writing
down, in drafting the bill, a lot of words under a misconception as to
their legal meaning. The intent of the legislature prevails in construing
statutes, and the legislature is presumed to mean what the statute says.
When a statute is so poorly worded that the courts cannot determine
from its wording and phraseology what the legislature intended, it is
confronted with a vexing problem. Especially is it vexing when the courts
are aware that the legislature doubtless waived the reading of the bill
when it was presented and the individual legislators, when voting an
enactment of it, had no actual knowledge whatsoever as to what the
provisions were in the bill. The individual legislators have not been
polled on the matter, so it is impossible to know how many of them
thought, when they voted on House Bill 1125, that they were voting for
the adoption of the draft prepared by this author. Two legislators have
already informed him that that was their belief at the time their votes
were cast. This author is quite positive that the legislators would not
have voted the adoption of House Bill 1125 if they had been familiar
with its contents. Certainly, those who have a reasonably broad knowledge
of modern statutory corporation law would not have.
This author has discussed the passage of House Bill 1125 with a total
of six of the legislators who voted for it and all but one of the six stated
that they had no knowledge of what the content of the bill was when
it was enacted. The sixth one stated that he studied it, but admitted
that he did not know anything about corporation law. Possibly the
Governor, or one of his advisers, read it as it became a law without his
signature.
A news report stating that a major portion of the new act was taken
froTm the draft of a proposed Florida business corporation code prepared
by the Corporation Code Drafting Committee appeared in a Miami
newspaper. The newspaper item gave credit, for supplying the information,
to the legislator who served as Chairman of the Legislative Committee
which favorably voted out House Bill 1125 with its recommendation for
passage. Certainly, if the Chairman of that committee believed that the
bill was substantially taken from the draft prepared by the Corporation
Code Drafting Committee, many of the legislators who voted for its
enactment into law may have acted on a like belief.
This author was appointed Chairman and Draftsman of the Corporation
Code Drafting Committee by the Statutory Revision Committee of the
Attorney General's Office, the Law Reporting Committee of the Florida
State Bar, and the Joint Statutory Revision Committees of the House
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and Senate in January, 1951. rTjis author as Chairman and Draftsman
worked gratituitously for two years in completing a modern, comprehensive
proposed Florida Business Corporation Code which was available in its
perfected form for consideration of the 1953 Session of the Legislature.
But in making a thorough study of House Bill 1125, he has not found
even one clause or sentence in it which was taken from the draft prepared
by him, in spite of the fact that he was the draftman of the Business
Corporation Code adopted by the Oklahoma Legislature in 1947, drafted
all of the annotations on the Oklahoma act for West's Oklahoma Statutes
Annotated, and has written more articles on the modern trends in statutory
corporation law than any other living person.
IV. ANALYSIS OF BIENNIAL CouRT DECISIONS
Slightly more than a score of decisions on Florida corporation law
have been rendered by appellate courts during the last biennium, and
these dealt with only a few segments of the law in that field.
Because of its significance, the case of State ex rel. Losey v. Willard80
is mentioned, although it dates back slightly over two years. In that case
the relators, Losey and the Rolfe Armored Truck Service, Inc., a Florida
corporation, as two of several defendants, were charged on an information
based exclusively upon an indictment returned by a grand jury of Dade
County.8' The Rolfe Truck Service, Inc., contended that the criminal
court of record should be prohibited from proceeding on the information
since the indictment returned by the grand jury was based solely upon
evidence obtained from an examination of the books and records of the
corporation which it was commanded to produce under a subpoena duces
tecum and that because of the use of such evidence the corporation had
been compelled to give evidence against itself before the grand jury, in
violation of its constitutional right against self-incrimination and hence was
entitled to immunization from prosecution, under Florida Statutes, Section
932.29, 1941; and that the relator, being a corporation and not a natural
person, was not subject to prosecution under the gambling laws of the
state.
The Supreme Court held: (1) that a corporation could not evoke
the plea of self-incrimination, and (2) that a corporation is not a "person"
within constitutional provision that no person can be compelled in a
criminal case to give evidence against himself and hence it cannot claim
any personal privilege against self-incrimination, nor could it claim
inmmunization against criminal prosecution.
S0. 54 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1951).
81. On the validity of the information, see State ex rel. Byer v. Willard, 54 So.2d
179 (Fla. 1951).
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In Sarasota Kennel Club v. Shea, 2 the question presented was whethet
the word "Seal" typewritten following the names of the corporation, its
president, and another, as makers of a promissory note, made it a sealed
instrument. The court held that it did, stating that there need be no
impression to constitute a corporate seal. Justice Matthews stated that
"this question was settled many years ago in the case of Campbell v.
McLaurin Investment Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277."
Two questions were presented in Brensinger v. Margaret Ann Super
Market.3 Two minority shareholders, one owning 15 shares and the other
owning one share out of a total of 16,470 shares of common, filed a
derivitive suit against the management. As to the first question, the
court held that a complaint, alleging that defendant Pentland, by belittling
the value of the shares of the corporation, had acquired for himself and
his associates, partially with corporate funds, at ridiculously low prices
below market value a total of 7,184 of the voting common shares, had
used the power thus acquired to cause the directors to vote the defendants
excessive funds, and had committed other fraudulent acts, was not
adequate, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 23(b), in
that the allegations merely set out generalities and conclusions. On the
second point, the court ruled that the complaint was also defective in
that it showed on its face that the cause of action was barred by the
Florida statutes of limitation and the plaintiffs would, therefore, be estopped
and barred from bringing the action.
The Florida Supreme Court 4  held that when the defendant
corporation actually received the benefit of the loan, it was a proper
party in equity in an action on a note, and the complaint was adequate
when it alleged: that the individual defendant had formed three corporations
as his alter egos, that the plaintiff lent money on the note of one of the
corporations, with additional security of an assignment of any interest
the individual defendant had or might receive in a hotel being built,
that the individual defendent was insolvent, that the corporation that made
the note was bankrupt, and that the defendant corporation was in fact
an undisclosed principal and had received full benefit of the loan.
It was held that the circuit court of the county where the defendant
corporation was authorized by its charter to maintain a branch office
and where it did maintain such office, had, under the provisions of Florida
Statutes, Section 46.04, 1951, venue in an action against the defendant
filed in the court of such county. 5
In Hanes v. Watkins,88 the plaintiff and defendant entered into a
82. 56 So.2d 505 (Ma. 1952).
83. 192 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1951).
84. Gross v. Cohen, 58 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1952).
85. Central Life Insurance Co. of Fla. v, Afra-American Life Insurance Co., 61 So.2d
653 (Fla. 1952).
86. 63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953).
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contract to purchase the shares of and take over a Florida corporation.
The contract fully set out the terms of the agreement, including the
interest and functions of each. The purchase was made and they arranged
the internal set-up of the corporation, electing themselves as officers. The
business prospered and expanded, the only important change being the
change in the name of the corporation. The final result was that the plaintiff
owned 49 per cent of the shares and the other 51 per cent were owned
by the defendant. For a reason not stated in the case, the plaintiff filed
an action seeking to have the court declare that the relationship between
the parties was that of a partnership, and, if it were found to be a
shareholders' relationship, then that the corporation be wound up. The
trial court found that the relationship was that of shareholders of a
corporation and that there were no grounds alleged justifying the court
to order that it be wound up. The holding was affirmed on appeal,
Justice Drew stating that the facts supported the trial court's decision
as to the relaionship between the parties and that there was no showing
that the corporation had reached such a stage that the purposes for
which it was formed were impossible of attainment, or that it had practically
discontinued all its business, or that there was such a deadlock among the
shareholders that the affairs of the corporation could not be legally
transacted.
In another very recent, somewhat similar case,87 the same two
elements were presented, and the ruling on each was the same as in
Hanes v. Vatkins. The parties to the suit each owned one-half of the
stock of a Florida corporation which operated a hotel under a leasehold.
The parties had their little differences-about such matters as leaving the
television set in disrepair, playing cards, failing to provide Christmas parties,
and other small incidences repulsive to the hotel guests. Tie plaintiff
contended that since there were but the two parties, each owning a
one-half interest, a partnership relation resulted, and, if the organization
was a corporation, a dissolution thereof should be decreed. The court
pointed out that the organization was incorporated and was a going
concern, and expressed its reasoning in language similar to that stated in
the Hanes case.
Generally an equity court will not interfere with internal management
of a private corporation, unless the acts thereof are ultra vires, fraudulent,
or otherwise illegal.88 In application of this rule, Justice Mathews decreed
that the management of a strictly private hospital corporation had the
authority to exclude any physician from practicing therein. On the other
hand, a Florida corporation cannot seek and obtain benefits from the
laws of the state and at the same time escape liabilities imposed thereby. 0
87. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953).
88. West Coast Hospital Ass'n v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1953).
89. Cay v. Inter-County 'I'el. & Tel. Co., 60 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1952).
CORPORATIONS
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that a corporation's
check which requires that it be countersigned by the corporation's
comptroller was invalid until so countersigned.90  However, the court
went on to hold that such countersigning executed when the check was
presented for payment validated the instrument by a form of ratification
by the comptroller.
The largest single mass of cases has involved actions seeking a
rescission of sales of corporate stock on the grounds of fraud or duress.
A total of six such cases were decided during the last two years,91 and
in each instance relief was denied because of laches of the party seeking
to set the contract aside or the lack of proof of actual fraud or duress.
Since these cases involve corporate securities, a fuller analysis of them
is left to the article on corporate finances elsewhere in this issue of
the Quarterly.
Three cases involved the interpretation of Florida Statutes, Section
47.17, 1951, as applied to service in this state on agents of foreign
corporations. In one, 2 the defendant in a tort action was a Georgia
corporation, and process was served on one Futch, who resided in Florida,
had formerly marketed the defendant's products in this state, and had
been appointed as the defendant's agent exclusively for acceptance of
process served by the Commissioner of Agriculture pursuant to regulations
under the Commercial Feed Law, Florida Statutes, Chapter 580, 1941.
In holding the service inadequate, Acting Chief Justice Terrell said,
A business agent as contemplated by the law means more
than one appointed for a limited or particular purpose. It has
reference to one having general authority to act for the corporation
within the state. Its duties must be closely related to the duties
of the officers of the corporation. He must be authorized to manage
the business of the corporation or some branch of it within the
state and stand in the shoes of the foreign corporation.
Another ease9" reached a like result. The defendant was a New York
corporation and service was had on a minor agent of a local branch
of the defendant. The court pointed out that the purpose of Section
47.17 is to have service made upon one who is held responsible by the
corporation, and it contemplates that service shall be made whenever
possible 11)Ott the more responsible officers before resorting to service
upon one of the inferior officers or agents of the corporation.
90. Black v. Howard Lober, 60 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1952).
91. McCormick v. Lewis, 102 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Fla. 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 861(5th Cir. 1953); Street v. Bartow Growers Processing Corp., 67 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1953);
Gerken v. Streit, 66 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1953); Ft. Myers Hardware Co. v. Stock, 65
So.2d 477 (Fla. 1953); Gordon v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank, 56 So.2d 531(Fla. 1952); Nam Han v. Yedlin, 56 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1952).
92. Valdosta Milling Co. v. Garretson, 54 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1951)-
93. National Organization Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, Inc. v. Banks,
196 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1952).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
In the third case,94 the sheriff's return of process stated that service
was made on a named person as director of the defendant foreign
corporation in the absence of superior officers. The court held that under
the provisions of Section 47.17, the return on its face was valid, but
when evidence was presented showing that the person served was not
a director, it then could not stand. Howcvcr, as here, where it was
further proved that such person was an agent of the defendant transacting
business within Florida and that all superior officers and directors,
mentioned in the first four enumerations in Section 47.17, were absent
from the state, the service would still be valid upon the return being
amended so as to speak the truth.
Three cases were considered involving the matter of corporations
being barred from maintaining an action because of failing to file required
reports and pay the required taxes. Such objections must be raised in due
time, and a motion to dismiss duly filed, in order to he recognized.05
Moreover, if the plaintiff corporation makes such filing and pays the
required fees before final disposal of the case the compliance corrects
the defect. 6
In Advertects v. Sawyer Industries," the question was presented as
to whose agent the receiver of a corporation was. Justice Mathews pointed
out that the receiver was subject to the orders and control of the court
and was not the agent of the corporation that petitioned for his appointment.
94. Largay Enterprises v. Berman, 61 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952).
95. 1825 Collins Ave. Corp. v. Rudnick, 67 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1953).
96. Matanzas Packing Co. v. Rayonier, 195 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1952); Broadway
Builders v. W. W. Arnold Constrnction Co., 59 So2d 26 (Via. 1952).
97. 64 So.2d 300 (17a. 1953).
